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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
NOONAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
Matthew Mortimer appeals his conviction of being a felon 
in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
922(g)(1). On January 10, 1996 Mortimer hit a parked car 
as he made a right hand turn. Philadelphia Police Officer 
Robert Ellis pulled in behind him and got out to investigate. 
Ellis confronted Mortimer who became combative and 
struggled physically with Ellis, eventually pulling a gun on 
him. Ellis knocked the gun from his hand. As thefight 
continued, Ellis found a second gun on him. Eventually 
Mortimer was subdued and booked at the police station, 
signing a property receipt for two guns. 
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At trial Mortimer stipulated to being a felon. The 
government offered the testimony of the two arresting 
officers and three other eyewitnesses to establish the facts 
just stated. The defense challenged the credibility of the 
witnesses and offered the testimony of the detective from 
the Philadelphia Police Department who investigated the 
case and took the statements of the arresting officers. 
Mortimer was convicted. 
 
Mortimer's appeal would be without merit except for a 
singular circumstance of his trial. Defense counsel had 
barely begun her summation when the prosecutor made an 
objection only to withdraw it with the exclamation,"The 
judge is not here." The judge, who had been present at all 
of the prosecutor's argument, had indeed disappeared. He 
had given no notice to counsel or the jury that he was 
about to depart. He was simply gone. No good reason or 
indeed any reason was given for his disappearance. He was 
back on the bench in time to thank defense counsel for her 
speech and call on the prosecutor for her rebuttal. 
 
Whether the judge's absence from the bench is an error 
of constitutional magnitude is a question of law, and our 
review is plenary. See Lesko v. Owens, 881 F.2d 44, 50 (3d. 
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1036 (1990). On the facts 
of this case we hold that structural error occurred. 1 
 
A trial consists of a contest between litigants before a 
judge. When the judge is absent at a "critical stage" the 
forum is destroyed. Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 
873 (1989). There is no trial. The structure has been 
removed. There is no way of repairing it. The framework 
"within which the trial proceeds" has been eliminated. See 
Arizona v. Fulminante, 409 U.S. 279, 309-10 (1991). The 
verdict is a nullity. Gomez, 490 U.S. at 876 (1989). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Judge Becker notes that the Supreme Court has "found structural 
errors only in a very limited class of cases." Johnson v. United States, 
117 S. Ct. 1544, 1549 (1997). While Judge Becker believes that the 
preferable manner of deciding this case is under the harmless error 
standard of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (and he is 
satisfied that the patent error involved here was clearly not harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt), he believes that under the facts of this case, 
the label "structural" is not inappropriate. 
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We cannot, of course, anticipate every circumstance 
under which the judge's absence may destroy the structure. 
The structure normally stands if the parties consent to 
excuse the presence of a judge. Id. at 870; United States v. 
Love, 134 F.3d 595, 605 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 
2332 (1998); Stirone v. United States, 341 F.2d 253, 256 
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 902 (1965). No consent 
occurred here. Before whom was defense counsel to offer 
consent? That defense counsel continued her summation 
cannot be construed as consent. Was she to stop in mid- 
sentence as it were and wait for such time as the judge 
should reappear? She did her best under the circumstances 
but her carrying on in adversity cannot be turned into 
agreement to the judge's absence. 
 
The government contends that the defense must show 
prejudice. The government relies on Love and Stirone where 
consent made the difference and on two cases, Haith v. 
United States, 342 F.2d 158, 159 (3d Cir. 1965) and United 
States v. Boswell, 565 F.2d 1338, 1341-42 (5th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 99 S. Ct. 81 (1978), which have been made obsolete 
by Gomez, supra. An additional case, United States v. 
Pfingst, 477 F.2d 177, 195-96 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 93 
S. Ct. 2779 (1973), invoked by the government, does not 
bear on what happened here; it involved a judge's 
announced absence from the state for a short time during 
jury deliberations. Id. at 196. A single case, Heflin v. United 
States, 125 F.2d 700, 700 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 
687 (1942), is cited by the government where the judge was 
unexpectedly absent when the jury and counsel were in the 
courtroom. The absence was two or three minutes and 
explained as a trip to an adjacent lavatory. This precedent 
is not close enough to be persuasive and it belongs to an 
era when structural error was not the criterion. Prejudice to 
the defendant from the jury inferring that the defense was 
not worth listening to may have occurred; it is not 
necessary on this appeal for the defendant to demonstrate 
it. The structural defect determines the result. 
 
The judgment of the district court will be reversed and 
the case remanded for a new trial. 
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